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The Perfect Match: Solving the Due
Process Problem of Signature
Matching with Federal Agency
Regulation
ABSTRACT
Local election commissions in the United States disenfranchise
Americans when they erroneously reject voters’ mail-in ballots for
failed signature matches. Disenfranchisement is not only problematic
because it is dangerous to the health of American democracy, but also
because signature matching violates the procedural due process
protections voters are entitled to when they exercise their right to vote.
Furthermore, the practice of signature matching is one of many ballot
access restrictions that disproportionately impact minority voters
under the guise of voter fraud prevention. Expanding the Election
Assistance Commission’s mandate to allow it to develop more accurate
methods of ballot verification can reduce the risk of erroneously
depriving a person of the right to vote. Currently, most
voting-rights-related suits are brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment as equal protection or substantive due process claims. The
few procedural due process claims that are made assert that the right
to vote is protected as a liberty interest.
The right to vote is more properly framed as a property interest
because eligible people are entitled to the right through state statutes.
Moreover, an executive agency is well equipped to solve a procedural
due process problem because the law demands that the agency’s rules
and regulations be supported with adequate data and sound
reasoning, thereby reducing the risk of erroneous deprivation of the
right at stake. Ensuring that every eligible voter who wishes to cast a
ballot can do so is essential to maintaining the public’s faith in
democracy, and thereby essential to maintaining democracy itself.
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American democracy would be unrecognizable without the
right to vote.1 Nevertheless, millions of otherwise eligible Americans
are deprived of access to the franchise for a host of reasons.2 One
reason that has garnered more attention in recent years, especially
leading up to and after the 2020 Presidential Election, is the practice
of signature matching.3 Many local election officials use signature
1.

See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964)

(“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”).
in

2.
See P.R. Lockhart, How Shelby Cnty. v. Holder Upended Voting Rights
America, VOX (June 25, 2019, 7:29 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-

politics/2019/6/25/18701277/shelby-county-v-holder-anniversary-voting-rights-suppressioncongress [https://perma.cc/R9DR-G5SQ].
3.
See Nathaniel Rakich, Why Rejected Ballots Could Be a Big Problem in 2020,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 13, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-rejectedballots-could-be-a-big-problem-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/JST7-R3HK]; Connor Clerkin, Lane
Corrigan, Zahavah Levine, Aviel Menter, Christopher Meyer, Alexander Perry & Theodora
Raymond-Sidel, Mail Voting Litigation During the Coronavirus Pandemic, STAN.-MIT HEALTHY
ELECTIONS PROJECT 1 (Oct. 29, 2020), https://healthyelections.org/sites/default/files/2020-
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matching as a fraud prevention technique for absentee and mail-in
ballots.4 It seems simple—an official compares the signature on the
absentee ballot to a signature the election commission has on file—but
results all too often in the ballot’s rejection, without enough notice or
time for the voter to cure the ballot so that it can be counted.5
The problem of signature matching is exacerbated by the
United States’ history of disenfranchising minority communities.6
Historically, state and local legislatures have crafted restrictive
regulations to disenfranchise minority voters, often under the pretext
of voter fraud prevention, despite comprehensive federal legislation
that prohibits such maneuvers.7 Courts often uphold these restrictive
measures, even though there is thin evidence of voter fraud.8
Signature matching is particularly harmful because it is extremely
ineffective; most rejected ballots are legitimate and not the product of
voter fraud.9
This Note challenges the practice of signature matching from a
procedural due process perspective. It argues that voters whose ballots
are rejected for failing a signature match are not given the adequate
process to correct their ballots that they are entitled to under the US
Constitution. This Note further argues that voting is a property
interest for the purposes of procedural due process and, as such,
warrants protection by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the

11/Mail_Voting_Litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7H8-DULF] (providing a comprehensive
review of signature matching challenges made leading up to the 2020 Presidential Election).
4.
See Ali Bloomgarden, Arushi Gupta, Garrett Jensen, Zahavah Levine, Chris
Middleton & Kyra Sikora, Behind the Scenes of Mail Voting: The Rules and Procedures for
Signature Verification in the 2020 General Election, STAN.-MIT HEALTHY ELECTIONS
PROJECT
5
(Mar.
10,
2021),
https://healthyelections.org/sites/default/files/202106/Signature_Verification.pdf [https://perma.cc/E79A-8U2Z].
5.
See infra Section I.F.
6.
See Kyle Wiggers, Automatic Signature Verification Software Threatens
to
Disenfranchise
U.S.
Voters,
VENTUREBEAT
(Oct.
25,
2020,
10:25
AM),

https://venturebeat.com/2020/10/25/automatic-signature-verification-software-threatens-todisenfranchise-u-s-voters/ [https://perma.cc/85T7-8FQG]; Pema Levy, The 200-Year History of
Using Voter Fraud Fears to Block Access to the Ballot, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 3, 2019),

https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/01/the-200-year-history-of-using-voter-fraudfears-to-block-access-to-the-ballot/ [https://perma.cc/N9ZW-QNFR] (explaining the historical
use of voter ID laws to suppress the Black vote in the South).
7.
See infra Part I.
8.
See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194–96 (2008)
(upholding an Indiana voter ID requirement for in-person voting despite no evidence of voter
impersonation ever occurring in Indiana).
9.
See Brief for Plaintiffs at 2, League of Women Voters v. LaRose, 489 F. Supp. 3d 719
(S.D. Ohio 2020) (No. 2:20-cv-3843) [hereinafter Ohio Motion].
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Constitution.10 Finally, this Note proposes that, in order to safeguard
eligible voters from misidentified failed signature matches, the
Election Assistance Commission’s mandate should be expanded to
allow it to formulate regulations regarding the most technologically
sound ways to prevent absentee ballot voter fraud.11
The problem of erroneously rejecting absentee ballots is not a
trivial one.12 Confidence in the US voting system depends on its
accuracy and reliability, and absentee ballot voters are already less
confident than in-person voters that their votes will be counted.13 This
uncertainty can dissuade people from voting at all.14 The issue has
been exacerbated by attacks on the security and legitimacy of the US
election system in the wake of the 2020 Presidential Election.15
Elections are fundamental to democracies; loss of the public’s faith in
the legitimacy of elections could lead to a constitutional crisis.16
Adding safeguards to absentee voting and eliminating procedural
hurdles that often lead to the rejection of these ballots will increase
confidence in US elections and bestow eligible voters with a
fundamental democratic right, thereby strengthening American
democracy.17

10.
11.
12.
13.
Carolina’s

See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
52 U.S.C. § 20922.
See Rakich, supra note 3.
See Molly E. Reynolds, Understanding the
9th
District,
BROOKINGS

Election
(Dec.

Scandal
7,

in

North
2018),

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/12/07/understanding-the-election-scandal-innorth-carolinas-9th-district/ [https://perma.cc/X8AA-C6HY].
14.

See

id.;

Voter

Confidence,

MIT

ELECTION

DATA

&

SCI.

LAB,

https://electionlab.mit.edu/research/voter-confidence [https://perma.cc/HGV2-BE4D] (Apr. 2,
2021).
15.
See Jemima McEvoy, Trump’s Election Fraud Battle Has Inspired a ‘Surge’ of
Legislation
to
Restrict
Voting:
Report,
FORBES
(Feb.
8,
2021,
4:44
PM),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/jemimamcevoy/2021/02/08/trumps-election-fraud-battle-hasinspired-a-surge-of-legislation-to-restrict-voting-report/?sh=3a7baeb16cf8
[https://perma.cc/L9LA-KHGZ].
16.
See Lonna Rae Atkeson & Kyle L. Saunders, The Effect of Election Administration on
Voter Confidence, 40 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 655, 655 (2007).
17.
See id. at 657–58.
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I. BACKGROUND—THE FIGHT FOR THE FRANCHISE
To fully understand the procedural defects of absentee voting,
one must look to its historical development. Although absentee voting
originated in the Civil War, it took several years for this method of
voting to become commonplace.18 It was not until the civil rights
movement of the 1960s that major federal legislation emerged,
shaping the voting landscape more broadly.19 Two statutes of
particular importance are The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) and
the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).20
A. The Voting Rights Act and Civil Rights
The VRA is a landmark piece of civil rights and election law
legislation.21 Racial animus and violent discrimination ran rife in the
time leading up to the passage of the VRA.22 It was a pivotal moment
for civil rights, preceded by a long struggle to fight suppression of the
Black vote, particularly in the South.23
Despite the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870,
Black voters faced numerous obstacles when attempting to exercise
their right to vote.24 The 1960s were the last decade of the “Jim Crow”
era—a legal regime of racial segregation and discrimination.25
Segregationist beliefs were entrenched in US society and affected not
just voting but every facet of US public life.26 The Civil Rights Act of
1964 (CRA), heralded as an integral piece of legislation in the fight for
equality, failed to remedy voting rights discrimination.27 Getting the
CRA passed meant compromising with segregationist politicians on

18.
See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE : THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (2000).
19.
See ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS
IN AMERICA 6 (2016).
20.
See id. at 6, 218.
21.
See id. at 6.
22.
See id. at 17, 21–22, 31.
23.
See id. at 6.
24.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (protecting US citizens from the denial or abridgement
of their right to vote on the basis of their race); see BERMAN, supra note 19, at 6, 36.
25.
See
Jim
Crow
Laws,
HISTORY
(Mar.
26,
2021),
https://www.history.com/topics/early-20th-century-us/jim-crow-laws [https://perma.cc/A6NL6WL6].
26.
See id. (explaining that laws enforcing segregation applied to various institutions,
including schools, restaurants, and hospitals); BERMAN, supra note 19, at 17.
27.
See BERMAN, supra note 19, at 33.
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voting rights—a testament to the franchise’s power.28 Segregationists’
effective efforts to keep Black Americans off the voter rolls, in
conjunction with pivotal clashes between activists and law
enforcement, spurred President Lyndon B. Johnson to try his hand at
comprehensive voting rights legislation.29 His efforts resulted in the
VRA,30 one of the most comprehensive pieces of voting rights
legislation to date;31 it prohibits the state from denying anyone the
right to vote because of his or her race.32
The connection between the fight to expand voting rights as a
matter of civil rights and the related struggle to guarantee absentee
privileges to all eligible voters is potent.33 When the VRA outlawed
barriers to voter registration and voting itself (i.e., poll taxes and
literacy tests), those opposed to expanding the franchise came up with
new ways to impose barriers to ballot access.34 Absentee ballots—less
regulated compared to their in-person counterparts—offered an
avenue to do so.35 State concerns about fraud are legitimate because
free and fair elections are an integral part of a healthy democracy.36
However, there is evidence that concern about fraud is merely pretext
to deny minority populations the right to vote.37
B. The Rise of Voter Fraud Prevention
The racist and partisan roots of many “fraud prevention”
mechanisms are still salient today.38 With the expansion of absentee
voting came concerns about fraud and election security.39 States were
not concerned about fraud at the beginning of absentee voting’s
expansion.40 Absentee ballots being identical to conventional ballots
28.
See id. at 14.
29.
See id. at 4–6.
30.
See id.
31.
See id.
32.
See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
33.
See Liz Crampton, Inside the Democratic Strategy to Expand Voting Rights State by
State, POLITICO (Apr. 20, 2021, 7:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/20/votingrights-states-482493 [https://perma.cc/X9PM-A6DX].
34.
See, e.g., KEYSSAR, supra note 18, at 211–12.
35.
See 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10304.
36.
See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, at vii, xi (2006).
37.
Levy, supra note 6.
38.
See Bertrall L. Ross II & Douglas M. Spencer, Passive Voter Suppression: Campaign
Mobilization and the Effective Disenfranchisement of the Poor, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 633, 643–50
(2019).
39.
See Ohio Motion, supra note 9, at 1.
40.
See KEYSSAR, supra note 18, at 122.
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was enough to assuage those with fraud-related fears.41 This
laissez-faire attitude began to shift as more and more minorities and
immigrants registered to vote.42 Due to a mixture of legitimate
concern and racial animus, fraud prevention measures that restricted
voting-rights were passed as early as the end of the nineteenth
century.43 Amid rising tensions between “old-stock Americans” and the
flood of European immigrants to the United States, lawmakers who
sought to entrench their power and avoid upset by a rapidly growing
electorate passed restrictive registration and voting laws couched in
the language of fraud prevention.44 These lawmakers enacted a
diverse portfolio of restrictive voter-eligibility requirements.45 While
many voter fraud prevention measures of this era were used for
legitimate ends, their codification early in US history normalized
disenfranchisement.46 Since then, the courts have further legitimized
such tactics as an effective means of voter fraud prevention despite
evidence of their dubious nature.47 The courts were right in one
respect—they were effective, but not at fraud prevention.48 Rather,
they succeeded at preventing millions of eligible voters from exercising
their democratic rights.49
The VRA addressed the particular problem of state
governments that enacted restrictive voting regulations with an aim
to disenfranchise Black and other minority communities.50 However,
successful legal challenges to some of the VRA’s foundational

41.
See id.
42.
See BERMAN, supra note 19, at 213–17.
43.
See KEYSSAR, supra note 18, at 111.
44.
See id. at 110–11. Many lawmakers were unabashed about their desire to keep the
poor, immigrants, and non-white people off of the voter rolls. See id. at 98.
45.
See id. at 103–04. These requirements included requiring literacy tests, lengthening
mandatory residency periods, abolishing noncitizen aliens’ right to vote, restricting elections to
property owners or taxpayers, and imposing onerous registration procedures. See id.
46.
See id. at 123–24 (explaining that voter registration was used to break down corrupt
political machines).
47.
See id. at 127; Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185–91 (2008).
For example, the Union League Club was founded in 1879 by Chicago elites who were concerned
that they would lose political power to Democrats. See KEYSSAR, supra note 18, at 124. The club
launched a campaign of polling place “investigators” to find and stop illegal voting, but all of the
alleged perpetrators who were apprehended were later acquitted. See KEYSSAR, supra note 18, at
124, 129 (referring to a study by Paul Kleppner, which found very little evidence of fraud during
this time period).
48.
See KEYSSAR, supra note 18, at 128.
49.
See id.
50.
See 52 U.S.C. § 10301.
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provisions have weakened it over time.51 No longer hindered by VRA
restrictions on different types of voting laws, states rushed to enact
restrictive voter fraud prevention measures, including restrictions on
the use of absentee ballots.52 For example, in 2017, Republican
lawmakers in Georgia passed a law requiring information on a voter’s
registration to exactly match the voter’s supporting documents.53
These measures disproportionately impact voters of color, who more
often lack the requisite ID to comply with strict voter-ID laws than
white voters, or who typically use mail-in voting in greater numbers.54
More recently, in the wake of the 2020 election, South Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Connecticut have proposed new legislation that
adds a signature match requirement for all absentee ballots.55 The
Pennsylvania bill only gives voters whose ballots have been rejected
six days to cure a signature after notification of a mismatch.56
Evidence of voter fraud has not increased since the
introduction of voter restrictions in the late nineteenth century, yet its
use as a pretextual reason to shrink the franchise has remained
steady throughout modern times.57 Absentee ballot fraud rhetoric, like
51.
See generally Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (invalidating the coverage
formula that determined which states needed their new voting laws “precleared” by the
Department of Justice).
52.
See Lockhart, supra note 2.
53.
See Stanley Augustin, Georgia Largely Abandons Its Broken “Exact Match” Voter
Registration
Process,
LAW.’S
COMM.
FOR
C.R.
UNDER
L.
(Apr.
5,
2019),

https://lawyerscommittee.org/georgia-largely-abandons-its-broken-exact-match-voterregistration-process/ [https://perma.cc/X6Q5-RSBS]. This “exact match” system has been largely
abandoned by the Georgia Legislature since 2019, but residual burdens on voters remain. See id.
54.
See, e.g., id; Theodore R. Johnson & Max Feldman, The New Voter Suppression,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/new-voter-suppression [https://perma.cc/495K-NVJK]; Amy Gardner, Rejection of
Hundreds of Absentee Ballots in Suburban Atlanta County Draws Legal Challenges, WASH. POST
(Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rejection-of-hundreds-of-absentee-

ballots-in-suburban-atlanta-county-draws-legal-challenges/2018/10/16/dafce19a-d177-11e8b2d2-f397227b43f0_story.html [https://perma.cc/NY66-TUDR]. It should be noted, however,
that Black voters were less likely to vote by mail in the 2020 Presidential Election.
See
The
Voting
Experience
in
2020,
PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Nov.
20,
2020),

https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/11/20/the-voting-experience-in-2020/
[https://perma.cc/36W3-XWPH].
55.
See Voting Laws Roundup: January 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 26, 2021),

https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-january2021 [https://perma.cc/C4Q3-AQJ3]. The 2020 election cycle saw significant victories by the
Democratic party and a rash of unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud by Republican lawmakers,
including former President Trump. See McEvoy, supra note 15.
56.
See Voting Laws Roundup: January 2021, supra note 55.
57.
See Richard L. Hasen, Opinion: Trump Is Wrong About the Dangers
of
Absentee
Ballots,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
9,
2020),
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in-person ballot fraud rhetoric, is not new.58 This language was
especially prominent leading up to and after the 2020 Presidential
Election, in part because of the expectation that the COVID-19
pandemic would drive the use of absentee ballots higher than ever
before.59
Absentee ballot fraud is more prevalent than in-person voter
fraud, but its occurrence is still rare.60 A study found that between
2000 and 2012, 491 fraudulent absentee ballots were cast out of
billions of votes cast during that time period.61 There have been so few
fraudulent ballots because absentee ballot fraud is incredibly difficult
to orchestrate, even without additional safeguards like signature
matching.62 Fraud perpetrated with absentee ballots often includes
vote buying; however, in the United States, the use of the secret ballot
has made vote buying virtually impossible.63 When significant
absentee ballot fraud does occur, it is detected swiftly and remedied
easily.64 Moreover, the connection between absentee ballot fraud and a
signature match’s ability to thwart fraud is weak at best.65 A
signature match serves to confirm the identity of the voter.66 Voter
impersonation is primarily a concern for in-person votes cast at polling
places and, again, is exceedingly rare.67

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/09/trump-is-wrong-about-dangersabsentee-ballots/ [https://perma.cc/6D8P-WGU8]; Levy, supra note 6.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See BERMAN, supra note 19, at 216–18.
See Hasen, supra note 57.
See id.
See id.
See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT
ELECTION MELTDOWN 60 (2012).
63.
See Susan Orr & James Johnson, Voting by Mail Is Convenient, but Not Always
Secret, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 24, 2020, 8:20 AM), https://theconversation.com/voting-bymail-is-convenient-but-not-always-secret-144716
[https://perma.cc/5WHV-MUMP].
Vote
buying is when a political operative pays voters to vote for his preferred candidate. See Frederic
Charles Schaffer & Andreas Schedler, What Is Vote Buying?, in ELECTIONS FOR SALE: THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF VOTE BUYING 17, 17 (Frederic Charles Schaffer ed., 2007). The
secret ballot foils vote buying schemes because the operative cannot verify that a voter selected
the operative’s preferred candidate. See id. at 20.
64.
See HASEN, supra note 57 (explaining that North Carolina’s bipartisan election
board voted to hold the election anew after overwhelming evidence that a Republican operative
had arranged to alter and destroy absentee ballots).
65.
See infra Section I.D.
66.
See Clerkin et al., supra note 3, at 2.
67.
See HASEN, supra note 57.
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C. HAVA and Federal Election Administration Regulation
HAVA sought to address the plethora of issues that arose in
the 2000 Presidential Election, namely, out-of-date and unreliable
punch-card technology.68 It became the first piece of major federal
legislation to address election administration. It created the Election
Assistance Commission (EAC) and authorized $3.9 billion of funding
to update outdated voting machine technology.69
More than twenty years later, the fate of the agency is still
somewhat tenuous—it was conceived by compromise, like most
significant pieces of legislation, so there was some debate about the
scope of the agency’s ability to compel states to adopt particular
election procedures.70 More recently, some members of Congress have
expressed the desire to eliminate the agency altogether, but others
have emphasized its importance in the wake of speculation about
foreign interference in the 2016 Presidential Election.71 The EAC has
significant potential as a solution to signature matching, but its
current ability to create and enforce election administration
regulations is limited.72
D. How Signature Matching Works (or Doesn’t)
Advocates who wish to expand absentee voting have made
significant strides in the last several decades, but much work remains
if the ultimate goal is to guarantee every eligible US citizen the right
to vote.73 Today, all states allow civilians to vote by mail, but the
requirements among different states vary widely.74 As of the 2020
Presidential Election, all fifty states require a signature on their

68.
See Trenton I. Weaver, E-nie, ME-nie, MInE – VOTE: How to Encourage Internet
Voting Innovation, 12 ISJLP 327, 327–31 (2016); Atkeson & Saunders, supra note 16, at 655.
69.
See Atkeson & Saunders, supra note 16, at 655.
70.
See KARON L. SHANTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45770, THE U.S. ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMMISSION: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3–4 (June 14, 2019),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45770.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJN7-GKG8] [hereinafter EAC
OVERVIEW].
71.
Id. at 17, 19, 23.
72.
See infra Part IV.
73.
See Voting by Mail and Absentee Voting, MIT ELECTION DATA & SCI. LAB,
https://electionlab.mit.edu/research/voting-mail-and-absentee-voting [https://perma.cc/8W3TA8JU] (Mar. 16, 2021).
74.
Absentee/Mail-in Voting, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Absentee/mailin_voting [https://perma.cc/7KRD-BX9T] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
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absentee ballots; thirty-two require a signature match to be counted.75
Only eighteen states require voters to be notified when their signature
does not match.76 Four states do not allow for corrections
whatsoever.77
The methods used for conducting signature matching vary from
state to state.78 Proponents of signature matching claim that it
protects the security of ballots by requiring a voter to legally declare
that the ballot is his or hers and verify that he or she is indeed the
person who signed the ballot.79 Whether a state achieves that goal
through signature matching is in doubt.80 For illustrative purposes,
this Note examines the state of Ohio where litigation challenging the
use of signature matching is prevalent.81
An Ohio statute requires election officials to compare the
signature on the outside of mail-in absentee envelopes with the
signature on the voter’s registration form.82 If there is a signature
mismatch, the Board of Elections must “give the voter an opportunity
to supplement the voter’s identification envelope” to cure the defect
and notify the voter of the rejection by “written mail.”83 In the wake of
the COVID-19 pandemic, a directive passed by the Ohio governor
expanded the county boards’ notification abilities by allowing them to
“utilize telephone and email addresses.”84 Despite this seemingly
straightforward instruction, it has not been implemented effectively.85

75.

See

How

Do

Election

Workers

Match

Signatures?

(2020),

BALLOTPEDIA,

https://ballotpedia.org/How_do_election_workers_match_signatures%3F_(2020)
[https://perma.cc/EJH5-WL4K] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
76.
See VOPP: Table 15: States that Permit Voters to Correct Signature Discrepancies,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-

and-campaigns/vopp-table-15-states-that-permit-voters-to-correct-signaturediscrepancies.aspx [https://perma.cc/6PDZ-YV8R]. Whether the state actually gives the voter a
meaningful opportunity to cure their ballot is another issue. See infra Section I.F.
77.
See How Do Election Workers Match Signatures? (2020), supra note 75.
78.
See id.
79.
See David A. Graham, Signed, Sealed, Delivered—Then Discarded, ATLANTIC (Oct.
21, 2020, 5:47 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/signature-matchingis-the-phrenology-of-elections/616790/ [https://perma.cc/9MAY-JMCB].
80.
See Ohio Motion, supra note 9, at 10.
81.
See, e.g., Ohio Motion, supra note 9; League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Larose, 489
F. Supp. 3d 719, 738–39 (S.D. Ohio 2020).
82.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3509.06(D)(1) (LexisNexis 2021); Ohio Motion, supra
note 9, at 6.
83.
See Ohio Motion, supra note 9, at 7–8.
84.
See id. at 8.
85.
See id. at 8–9.
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Ohio’s signature matching process has material defects and
inconsistencies across counties in both the methods used to signature
match and the notification process to cure ballots.86 Election officials
have broad discretion to challenge the signature on a mail-in ballot
because of a perceived mismatch; there is no process or set of
standards they must adhere to when comparing signatures.87 The
method of signature matching used in Ohio, and most commonly
nationwide, is simply “eyeballing” it—an election worker manually
compares the signature on the ballot to a signature on file.88 The
comparison signature on file can come from a number of places: from
the voter’s registration form, from an old ballot application, or
captured by a stylus—at a government office like the Bureau of Motor
Vehicles, for example.89 Different Ohio counties use different types of
signatures to conduct matching, and each has varying levels of
accuracy.90 The lack of uniformity by which signatures are collected
across counties means that a voter’s risk of ballot rejection is
arbitrarily determined by the county in which he or she resides.91

86.
87.
88.
(2020),

See id. at 6, 7 nn.6–7, 33.
See id. at 6, 7 n.6, 33–34.
See ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, SIGNATURE VERIFICATION AND CURE PROCESS 3

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/vbm/Signature_Verification_Cure_Pr
ocess.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5ZQ-KPBX] [hereinafter EAC SIGNATURE GUIDANCE]; Wiggers,
supra note 6.
89.
See Ohio Motion, supra note 9, at 7 n.7.
90.
See Ohio Motion, supra note 9, at 7 n.7; Sabri Ben-Achour, Robots Will Be Verifying
Some of Our Ballots. Can We Trust Them?, MARKETPLACE (Oct. 30, 2020),

https://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-tech/vote-by-mail-ballots-mismatchedsignatures-verification-software-disenfranchisement/
[https://perma.cc/VH2B-CMWY];
Signature Verification and Mail Ballots: Guaranteeing Access While Preserving Integrity, STAN.
L. SCH. L. & POL’Y LAB 2 (May 15, 2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-

content/uploads/2020/04/SLS_Signature_Verification_Report-5-15-20-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LK7B-TTNE] [hereinafter Stanford Report]. Moreover, stylus signatures are
characteristically distinct from wet signatures made by a pen on a paper absentee envelope,
which makes for a dubious comparison. See Wiggers, supra note 6.
91.
See Ohio Motion, supra note 9, at 33–34. Moreover, the processes by which different
counties make rejection determinations vary as well, exacerbating the lack of uniformity in Ohio
signature matching procedures and outcomes. See id. at 7 n.6. Inconsistent matching standards
and procedures are not unique to Ohio. See Stanford Report, supra note 90, at 2.
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There is evidence that the shortcomings of Ohio’s signature
match regime harm voters.92 According to a study of recent Ohio
elections, for every one ballot that was correctly rejected for mismatch,
an additional thirty-two valid ballots were erroneously rejected; in
other words, 97 percent of those signatures that “failed” were
legitimate ballots erroneously rejected.93 In another study, there was a
26 percent error rate among election workers, roughly three and a half
times the error rate of forensic document examiners.94 These findings
are not surprising considering that forensic document examiners
receive years of training, whereas election workers might attend an
hour-long workshop, if that.95 In addition, trained handwriting
analysts need several signature samples to make a comparison; Ohio
only conducts comparisons to the one signature on file from the voter’s
registration application.96 The fatigue of ballot counters, who often
work long hours counting thousands of ballots while under pressure
from election commissions and the public to get results as quickly as
possible, can make determinations even less accurate.97
92.
See Diana Harrison, Ted M. Burkes & Danielle P. Seiger, Handwriting Examination:
Meeting the Challenges of Science and the Law, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: FORENSIC SCI.
COMMC’N
(Oct.
2009),
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-sciencecommunications/fsc/oct2009/review/2009_10_review02.htm
[https://perma.cc/9UGG-PTSK]
(explaining that laypeople are less likely than forensic document examiners to identify
handwriting accurately); Amicus with Dahlia Lithwick, Dozens of Baby Bush v Gores, SLATE, at
13:37 (Aug. 29, 2020) (accessed through Spotify) (“[S]ignature match verification schemes are
total junk science . . . .”); Graham, supra note 79 (“As voting by mail surges across the country,
many elections, including the presidential race, could hinge on a process that one expert recently
described to me as ‘witchcraft.’”).
93.
See Ohio Motion, supra note 9, at 10.
94.
Id.
95.
See Graham, supra note 79; Fla. Dep’t of State, Signature Recognition
Workshop
Refresher
Course,
YOUTUBE
(June
25,
2020),

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jP7TDDFUHi4&feature=youtu.be
[https://perma.cc/MJF2-LKZP]; Or. Sec’y of State, 2019 04 26 10 03 Signature Verification Training, YOUTUBE (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKiYGONnNT0
[https://perma.cc/C734-YS5N]; Signature Verification Guide, COLO. SEC’Y OF STATE (Sept.
13, 2018), https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/docs/SignatureVerificationGuide.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/D5LV-XRHN]; Signature Verification Expert Witnesses, FORENSISGROUP

https://www.forensisgroup.com/expert-witness/signature-verification/
[https://perma.cc/HB7A-T6UT] (last visited Oct. 31, 2021) (explaining the services signature
verification experts provide).
96.
See Ohio Motion, supra note 9, at 10.
97.
See Miles Parks, Why Vote Counting in Pennsylvania and Michigan Takes So Long,
NPR (Nov. 4, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/04/931136905/we-ll-be-working24-hours-vote-counting-to-continue-through-the-week [https://perma.cc/DH9D-9K7E]; cf.
Claudette Allingham, Signature Verification: Man vs. Machine, PARASCRIPT BLOG (Mar.
28,
2013),
https://www.parascript.com/blog/signature-verification-man-vs-machine/
[https://perma.cc/HSJ5-7KM8] (“Similarly, a signature verification operator in a bank who has to
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Furthermore, signature matching disproportionately harms
different demographic groups.98 For example, the young, old, ill, and
non-native English speakers are at a higher risk of erroneous
deprivation because of increased signature variability.99 Young people
are less likely to have consistent signatures because cursive
instruction is now nearly obsolete in schools.100 Additionally, the
signature collected for comparison when a teen gets his or her driver’s
license can vary significantly from the one a voter uses as an adult to
vote by mail.101 Alternatively, older people or ill people are more likely
to show a decline in handwriting.102 Non-native English speakers are
also at a higher risk of having their ballots rejected because a weaker
command of English writing can lead to less consistent signatures.103
Similarly, first-time mail-in voters and people who have undergone
name changes (including married women, transgender people, and
domestic abuse survivors) are also much more likely to have their
ballots rejected.104
Concerningly, minority voters’ ballots are disproportionately
rejected.105 For example, in 2018, people of color comprised only 28
percent of Florida’s absentee voters, but 47 percent of all ballots
rejected for signature mismatch.106 In North Carolina, the rejection
rate of minority votes was more than double that of white votes during
early voting in the 2020 Presidential Election.107 Therefore, signature
matching is another barrier, among many others, that serves to
disproportionately disenfranchise minority voters.108
look at 200-300 signatures per hour, not only has a lower accuracy than a forensic expert, but
also makes more mistakes at the end of the day than in the morning.”).
98.
See Lila Carpenter, Signature Match Laws Disproportionately Impact Voters Already
on the Margins, ACLU (Nov. 2, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/voting-

rights/signature-match-laws-disproportionately-impact-voters-already-margins
[https://perma.cc/Q85K-LABZ].
99.
See Ohio Motion, supra note 9, at 10.
100.
See Graham, supra note 79.
101.
See id.
102.
See id.
103.
See Ben-Achour, supra note 90.
104.
See Graham, supra note 79; Wiggers, supra note 6.
105.
See, e.g., Wiggers, supra note 6; Sophie Chou, ProPublica & Tyler Dukes, WRAL
News, In North Carolina, Black Voters’ Mail-in Ballots Much More Likely to Be Rejected than
Those
from
Any
Other
Race,
PROPUBLICA
(Sept.
23,
2020,
2:30
PM),

https://www.propublica.org/article/in-north-carolina-black-voters-mail-in-ballots-muchmore-likely-to-be-rejected-than-those-from-any-other-race [https://perma.cc/436X-BPU7].
106.
107.
108.

See Wiggers, supra note 6.
See Chou & Dukes, supra note 105.
See Johnson & Feldman, supra note 54.
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Disproportionate ballot rejection cuts along party lines as
well.109 A Pew Research study conducted after the 2020 Presidential
Election found that 58 percent of Biden voters voted by mail,
compared to 32 percent of former President Trump voters.110 The
correlation of minority and young voter support with Democratic
candidates compounds the problem for those groups.111 Ballots for
Democratic candidates are therefore more likely to be rejected than
ballots for Republican candidates.112
E. Signature Matching Technology
There are better, more technologically sound methods to match
signatures, but state election commissions do not commonly utilize
them.113 They are also not without their own shortcomings, as
discussed below.
Automated Signature Verification (ASV), often used by banks
to verify checks, uses software to match signatures.114 Currently, eight
states use ASV to conduct absentee ballot signature matches.115 With
ASV, a camera captures the voter’s signature on the ballot as a worker
scans it for counting.116 The software then compares that image to the

109.
110.
111.

See The Voting Experience in 2020, supra note 54.
See id.
See, e.g., Yair Ghitza & Jonathan Robinson, What Happened in 2020, CATALIST,
https://catalist.us/wh-national/ [https://perma.cc/7WWH-EH4U] (last visited Oct. 31, 2021)
(finding that 39% of Biden-Harris voters were voters of color compared to 15% of Trump-Pence
voters); Kelly Beadle, Ruby Belle Booth, Alison Cohen, Peter de Guzman, Bennett Fleming
Wood, Noorya Hayat, Kei Kawashima-Ginsberg, Sarah Keese, Rey Junco, Kathleen Lanzilla,
Kristian Lundberg, Alberto Medina & Lauren Soherr, Election Week 2020: Young People Increase
Turnout, Lead Biden to Victory, TUFTS UNIV.: CTR. FOR INFO. & RSCH. ON CIVIC LEARNING
& ENGAGEMENT (Nov. 25, 2020), https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/election-week-2020
[https://perma.cc/RET7-LM9E] (finding that young voters preferred Biden to Trump by a 25point margin).
112.
See, e.g., Chou & Dukes, supra note 105 (explaining that Black voters were twice as
likely to have mail-in ballots rejected); Ohio Motion, supra note 9, at 10 (arguing that young voters’ mail-in ballots are more likely to be rejected); Ghitza & Robinson, supra note 111 (finding
that more voters of color voted for the Democratic candidate for President than the
Republican candidate in 2020); Beadle et al., supra note 111 (finding that more young voters voted for the Democratic candidate for President than the Republican candidate in 2020).
113.
See Ben-Achour, supra note 90.
114.
See What Is Automated Signature Verification, SQN BANKING SYS.,

https://sqnbankingsystems.com/blog/what-is-automated-signature-verification/
[https://perma.cc/V9P4-ZJK3] (last visited Oct. 31, 2021).
115.
See Ben-Achour, supra note 90.
116.
See EAC SIGNATURE GUIDANCE, supra note 88, at 2.
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signature the local election commission has on file.117 The software
looks at specific characteristics like a signature’s height, width,
symmetry, and stroke directions—it can detect discrepancies between
signatures that the human eye cannot distinguish, which leads to
more accurate determinations.118 ASV eliminates errors produced by
the “eyeball” method, which stem from human fatigue or lack of
expertise.119 It is also a relatively inexpensive technology, making it
accessible to many local governments.120
Nevertheless, even this more accurate method has worrisome
121
flaws, with accuracy rates ranging from 74 to 96 percent.122 There
are few studies on ASV in the specific context of absentee ballot
signature matching; the only statistics that currently exist come from
ASV software manufacturers themselves.123 Like many pieces of
technology meant to be neutral in their implementation, ASV can
perpetuate the human biases present in its algorithms, and has
security concerns.124 The technology does not eliminate the
disadvantages signature matching poses for foreign-language
speakers and the young, elderly, and disabled, who may have more
difficulty with script or whose signatures change over time.125
Algorithms are trained with a limited amount of
human-created data; they can replicate human biases or simply not
include enough information to create an algorithm that can read a
wide variety of signatures.126 Shorter or hyphenated names are more
likely to be rejected by ASV because the text of these names have
fewer “turning points and intersections,” which are technical
signature characteristics that the software reads in forensic signature

117.
118.

See id.; OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, ELECTION OFFICIAL MANUAL, at 9-16 (2021).
See Ben-Achour, supra note 90; Protect Against Fraud and Reduce Costs,
PARASCRIPT,
https://www.parascript.com/signature-verification/ [https://perma.cc/8W3WYM9R] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
119.
See Protect Against Fraud and Reduce Costs, supra note 118.
120.
See id.
121.
See What is Automated Signature Verification, supra note 114; EAC SIGNATURE
GUIDANCE, supra note 88, at 5; Portia Allen-Kyle, With Vote-by-Mail on the Rise, Automated
Signature Matching Is Not a Panacea for Election Officials, MEDIUM: PORTIA ALLEN-KYLE (July
6,
2020),
https://portiaallenkyle.medium.com/with-vote-by-mail-on-the-rise-automated-

signature-matching-is-not-a-panacea-for-election-officials-c7277ce04aba
[https://perma.cc/8858-W792].
122.
See Ben-Achour, supra note 90.
123.
See id.
124.
See Portia Allen-Kyle, supra note 121.
125.
See id.
126.
See Ben-Achour, supra note 90; Wiggers, supra note 6.

2021]

THE PERFECT MATCH

137

matching.127 One study even found that ballot rejections increased by
74 percent in California counties that introduced ASV without
requiring an initial review via the eyeball method.128
F. Ohio’s Inadequate Notice and Cure Procedures
Proponents of signature matching might counter that Ohio’s
notice provisions rectify any erroneous ballot rejections due to
inaccurate matching methods.129 However, the notice procedures in
many jurisdictions do not adequately remedy these errors.130 This is
primarily due to the inadequate time allotted to cure ballots and
improper utilization of notice procedures by county election boards.131
In Ohio, election boards stop notifying voters about signature
mismatches six days after election day, and voters only have until
seven days after election day to cure the error.132 This means that
those notified about a signature mismatch towards the end of the
notification period have little time to cure their ballot;133 in some
instances, mail delays can make it virtually impossible to do so.134 In
other instances, it is quite literally impossible to do so regardless of
the postal service’s efficiency; ballots received up to ten days after
election day are counted, but those arriving after the notice period
ends on the sixth day will not have an opportunity to cure at all.135
Some voters will not receive notification of their failure if it is not
discovered until after the notice period ends.136 The arbitrariness of
Ohio’s notice and cure deadlines is highlighted by the fact that
elections in Ohio do not need to be certified until twenty-one days
after election day.137 There is ample leeway in Ohio’s election schedule

127.
See Wiggers, supra note 6; Jodi Sita, Bryan Found & Douglas K. Rogers, Forensic
Handwriting Examiners’ Expertise for Signature Comparison, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1, 1, 6
(explaining that more “complex” signatures—those with more turning points and
intersections—can be more confidently matched or rejected).
128.
See Stanford Report, supra note 90, at 35.
129.
See, e.g., Clerkin et al., supra note 3, at 44 (explaining that states with notice and
cure procedures have such procedures to allow for the correction of an erroneous rejection).
130.
See id. at 41–44.
131.
See Ohio Motion, supra note 9, at 1–2.
132.
See id. at 3.
133.
See id. at 20–22.
134.
See, e.g., id. at 20.
135.
See id. at 22.
136.
See id. at 21.
137.
See Ohio Motion, supra note 9, at 22.
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to give voters more time to cure their ballots, but the state chooses not
to utilize it.138
Despite efforts in some states to improve notification and cure
processes, erroneous deprivations remain a risk due to the increasing
popularity of mail-in voting.139 For example, in Ohio’s 2016
presidential primary, only 8.7 percent of total votes were absentee
mail-in ballots.140 In comparison, Ohio’s 2020 presidential primary
had a staggering 85.3 percent of votes cast via absentee mail-in ballot,
albeit primarily due to COVID-19 concerns.141
In Georgia, rejections for failed signature match increased 350
percent from the 2018 midterm primaries to the 2020 presidential
primaries.142 In the lead-up to the 2018 midterm elections, more than
1,200 Georgia absentee ballots were rejected for a host of reasons,
including failed signature matches.143 Altogether, around 750,000
ballots were rejected for failed signature matches in the 2016 and
2018 presidential elections, and in the 2020 primaries, over 500,000
ballots were rejected for failed signature matches, among other
reasons.144
In the 2020 presidential election, approximately 560,000
ballots were rejected in total.145 Failing a signature match was the top
reason for rejections, accounting for 32.8% of all rejected ballots.146
Compared to the 2018 and 2016 federal elections, this is an increase in

138.
See id.
139.
See, e.g., Pia Deshpande, Ohio’s 2020 Presidential Primary and Comparisons
to
2016,
STAN.-MIT
HEALTHY
ELECTIONS
PROJECT
13
(July
27,
2020),

https://healthyelections.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/Ohio%20Election%20Memo(1).pdf
[https://perma.cc/SMU6-3KGV].
140.
Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Number of Absentee
Election
Increased
350%

Ballots Rejected for Signature Issues in
from
2018,
G A.
SEC’Y
OF

the

2020
STATE,

https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/number_of_absentee_ballots_rejected_for_signature_i
ssues_in_the_2020_election_increased_350_from_2018 [https://perma.cc/MH35-HR4Z] (last
visited Oct. 27, 2021).
143.
See Gardner, supra note 54.
144.
See Wiggers, supra note 6; Pam Fessler & Elena Moore, More than 550,000 Primary
Absentee Ballots Rejected in 2020, Far Outpacing 2016, NPR (Aug. 22, 2020, 5:00 AM),

https://www.npr.org/2020/08/22/904693468/more-than-550-000-primary-absentee-ballotsrejected-in-2020-far-outpacing-2016 [https://perma.cc/5SML-8PE6].
145
Election
Results,
2020:
Analysis
of
Rejected
Ballots,
BALLOTPEDIA
https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results,_2020:_Analysis_of_rejected_ballots#Reasons_for_r
ejection [https://perma.cc/ADR8-6YBC] (Sept. 10, 2021).
146 See id.
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the share of ballots that were rejected for failing a signature match.147
One analysis points out that although the total number of rejected
ballots increased, the rate of rejection decreased in 2020 compared to
2016.148 Despite this, the number of ballots rejected is often beyond
the margin of error in races that seem to get closer with every election
cycle.149
II. SIGNATURE MATCHING AS A PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS VIOLATION
The practice of signature matching, as executed, violates
procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.150 Procedural due process requires that the government
first provide adequate notice to parties when it seeks to deprive them
of a constitutionally protected interest (life, liberty, or property), and
second, that it provides an opportunity to be heard in the event the
party seeks to challenge the deprivation.151
The seminal case for analyzing procedural due process
challenges is Mathews v. Eldridge.152 The respondent, Eldridge,
received disability benefits from a program established under Title II
of the Social Security Act.153 After receiving reports from his doctors,
the state agency charged with monitoring his medical condition
determined he was no longer disabled and notified him that it had
made a tentative decision to terminate his benefits.154 Eldridge
countered that he was still injured, but the agency did not alter its
determination.155 This determination was accepted by the Social
Security Administration, at which point Eldridge was notified of the
See id.; Rejected Absentee/Mail-In Ballots in the 2016 and 2018 Elections, BALLOTPEDIA
https://ballotpedia.org/Rejected_absentee/mail-in_ballots_in_the_2016_and_2018_elections.
147

148.
See Rakich, supra note 3; Nathaniel Rakich, Why So Few Ballots Were Rejected in
2020, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 17, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-sofew-absentee-ballots-were-rejected-in-2020/
[https://perma.cc/9XJT-7Y5B];
Election
Results,
2020:
Analysis
of
Rejected
Ballots,
BALLOTPEDIA

https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results,_2020:_Analysis_of_rejected_ballots#Reasons_for_r
ejection [https://perma.cc/ADR8-6YBC] (Sept. 10, 2021).
149.
See Mark Nichols, Soo Rin Kim & Ivan Pereira, 750,000 Mail-in Ballots Were
Rejected in 2016 and 2018. Here’s Why That Matters, ABC NEWS (Oct. 19, 2020, 5:03 AM),

https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/750000-mail-ballots-rejected-2016-2018matters/story?id=73645323 [https://perma.cc/45DS-NBG9].
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
See id. at 323.
See id. at 324.
See id.
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agency’s final determination to terminate his benefits.156 He had six
months to seek reconsideration by the state agency, but he instead
brought an action in court.157 Eldridge argued that the agency failed to
give him adequate notice and opportunity to cure under the
Constitution’s due process requirements because due process requires
that his benefits not be terminated until after the evidentiary hearing
stage of any administrative proceeding.158
The Supreme Court concluded that the government met its
constitutional obligations.159 According to the Court, the procedures
used by the agency were adequate relative to the potential injustice
that would be done from an erroneous deprivation of benefits from a
deserving recipient.160 The Court developed a three-factor balancing
test to determine whether procedural due process was met: (1) the
importance of the interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation of that interest with the current procedures in place and
value of any additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the
government’s interest in the fiscal or administrative burdens that
additional process would entail.161 With these factors in mind, the
Court concluded that although Eldridge’s interest in disability benefits
was not insignificant, it did not reach the level of need-based financial
benefits, like welfare, that might be considered essential to one’s
continued well-being.162 Therefore, the degree of deprivation was not
high enough to reach the threshold of a due process violation.163
Furthermore, Eldridge’s medical condition could be adequately
assessed without an evidentiary hearing, and medical documentation
(e.g., written submission, x-rays, and lab results) is very reliable
evidence.164 Thus, the value of added procedure, such as an
evidentiary hearing or a more detailed explanation of the reasons for
termination in the agency’s notice to Eldridge, would not have reduced
any potential erroneous deprivation.165 Additional procedures in such
cases would only impose unnecessary costs on the government
156.
See id.
157.
See id. at 324–25.
158.
See id. at 325.
159.
See id. at 349.
160.
See id. at 339–43.
161.
See id. at 334–35.
162.
See id. at 342; Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 127 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that
financial-need based benefits for heat during the winter rose to the level of importance requisite
to find the agency’s notice without reasons inadequate).
163.
See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342–43.
164.
See id. at 344–45.
165.
See id.
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agency—it may even lead to instances where undeserving individuals
receive benefits from a limited pool of funding.166
Inherent in the Court’s analysis is an emphasis on the
importance of making accurate deprivation determinations.167
Procedural due process jurisprudence does not take deprivation
lightly—it wants to reduce the erroneous deprivation of rights as
much as possible.168 To achieve that, government actors must provide
enough process to allow only those deprivations that are deserved in
the eyes of the law.169
A. The Right to Vote as a Property Interest
The seminal cases on procedural due process center around the
deprivation of property interests, namely, those anchored in some
entitlement to a benefit from the government.170 Lower courts that
have reached the issue typically analyze whether voting is a liberty
interest for the purposes of procedural due process, and they are split
in their outcomes.171 However, there is a stronger argument that the
right to vote is a property interest created by a statutory
entitlement.172
“Property,” for the purposes of procedural due process, is not
limited to “real property.”173 The Court first expanded the traditional
notion of constitutional property in Goldberg v. Kelly when it
established that welfare benefits are a protectable property interest.174
It went on to expand this understanding of property to include implied
reliance interests.175 For example, successive employment contracts
that typically lead to a tenure offer at a public university create an
166.
See id. at 348.
167.
See id.
168.
See id. at 349.
169.
See id.
170.
See, e.g., id. at 320; Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2005); Goldberg v.
Kelly 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970).
171.
Compare Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 850 F. Supp. 2d 795, 846–47
(S.D. Ohio 2012) (finding no liberty interest in the right to vote), and Memphis A. Phillip
Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 482 F. Supp. 3d 673, 691 (M.D. Tenn. 2020) (finding no liberty
interest in the right to vote), with Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 48 (D. Me. 2001) (finding a
liberty interest in the right to vote), and Richardson v. Tex. Sec’y of State, 485 F. Supp. 3d 744,
777 (W.D. Tex. 2020) (finding a liberty interest in the right to vote).
172.
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Tracie Hunter at 29–30, Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of
Elections, 850 F. Supp. 2d 795 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (No. 11-3059).
173.
See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571—72 (1972).
174.
See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261–62, 262 n.8.
175.
See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600–02 (1972).
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entitlement protected by due process.176 However, a mere “unilateral
expectation” of entitlement does not constitute a property
interest—property interests are created by contract, are established
by positive law (e.g., state statute), or are implied by the proper
circumstances, as in the example of tenure.177 But the most common,
and often most crucial, way that the Court identifies a new property
interest is specific to those created by state statute.178 A claim of
entitlement exists when a state limits government officials’ discretion
to mandate a specific outcome based on fixed eligibility criteria.179 The
Court established this type of interest in the context of utility benefits
for low-income individuals.180 Criteria that constrained the
government’s discretion to fixed outcomes about who would be eligible
for benefits created an individual entitlement, or property interest,
that due process protected.181 The Court’s reasoning relied on values
that are the basis for due process: those entitled to benefits must know
whether they need to bring a challenge and how to tailor that
challenge effectively, or else they will be deprived of that interest.182
The right to vote follows the basic framework of
property-interest creation by state statute.183 In the same way
non-discretionary language creates property interests via benefit
regulation, non-discretionary language in state election procedure
statutes creates a property interest in the right to vote.184 Ohio, again,
can be an illustration of this concept:
Each person who will be of the age of eighteen years or more at the next ensuing
November election, who is a citizen of the United States, and who, if he continues
to reside in the precinct until the next election, will at that time have fulfilled all
the requirements as to length of residence to qualify him as an elector shall, unless
otherwise disqualified, be entitled to be registered as an elector in such precinct.
When once registered, an elector shall not be required to register again unless his
registration is canceled.185

176.
See Roth, 408 U.S. at 576–77.
177.
See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577–78.
178.
See Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2005).
179.
See id.
180.
See id. at 118.
181.
See id. at 113–14.
182.
See id. at 123–24; Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1162 (D. Or. 2014).
183.
See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Ben F.C. Wallace, Charting Procedural Due Process and the Fundamental Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 647,
667 (2016).
184.
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–62, 262 n.8 (1970); Kapps, 404 F.3d at 113;
Wallace, supra note 183, at 655.
185.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.07 (LexisNexis 2021).
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By effectively cabining government officials’ discretion regarding
voter-registration eligibility (persons eighteen or over who reside in
the proper precinct for enough time) the state creates an individual
entitlement to vote.186
The Southern District of Ohio found that although people have
a right to vote generally, they do not have a right to vote by absentee
ballot.187 Absentee voting is therefore not protected by procedural due
process.188 This view ignores the fact that there are specific individual
entitlements for absentee voting.189 Take Ohio again: “Any qualified
elector may vote by absent voter’s ballots at an election.”190 With one
sentence, the state entitles an individual to some process when their
right to vote absentee is curtailed, for a failed signature match or
otherwise.191 Constitutional requirements of procedural due process
aside, the Ohio legislature itself contemplated that individuals have
some right to cure a rejected ballot by codifying the right to do so.192
Ohio law requires election officials to notify voters of inconsistencies
on their absentee ballots, giving credence to the idea that voting is an
individual entitlement in the eyes of the Ohio legislature.193
The court also ignores the reality of voting today; mail-in only
and absentee voting are steadily overtaking the traditional process of

186.
See Kapps, 404 F.3d at 113. At least one lower court has found that plaintiffs
challenging the state’s signature matching processes under procedural due process have a statutory entitlement in the right to vote absentee. See, e.g., Frederick v. Lawson, 481 F. Supp. 3d
774, 789 (S.D. Ind. 2020).
187.
See League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Larose, 489 F. Supp. 3d 719, 738–39 (S.D.
Ohio 2020) (finding that the right to vote absentee is not an interest protected under due process
because “Ohio voters have multiple options to exercise their right to vote even if their ballot is
rejected due to signature mismatch . . . .”).
188.
See id. at 737–39. Conversely, an Arizona court ruled that despite absentee voting’s
less fundamental status as a “privilege and convenience for those unable to vote in person,” it
still required the state to comport with due process. See Raetzel v. Parks/Bellemont Absentee
Election Bd., 762 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D. Ariz. 1990). The court stated that, “While it is true that
absentee voting is a privilege and a convenience to voters, this does not grant the state the
latitude to deprive citizens of due process with respect to the exercise of this privilege.” Id.
189.
See Larose, 489 F. Supp. 3d at 738.
190.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3509.02(A) (LexisNexis 2021).
191.
See id.
192.
Id. § 3509.06.
193.
See id. § 3509.06(D)(3)(b) (“If the election officials find that the identification envelope statement of voter is incomplete or that the information contained in that statement does
not conform to the information contained in the statewide voter registration database concerning
the voter, the election officials shall mail a written notice to the voter, informing the voter of the
nature of the defect. The notice shall inform the voter that in order for the voter’s ballot to be
counted, the voter must provide the necessary information to the board of elections in writing
and on a form prescribed by the secretary of state . . . .”).
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in-person voting.194 The pandemic accelerated mail-in voting’s
popularity because it was the only safe option for millions of voters in
the 2020 election cycle.195 Moreover, there is no indication that the
popularity of mail-in voting will decline once the pandemic ends
because mail-in voting is more convenient than in-person voting.196
The precise method by which a vote is cast does not change the
character of the individual property interests at stake. When a state
makes mail-in voting an option, and an individual chooses that option,
his or her ability to participate in the franchise cannot be made more
uncertain because of that choice.197 Thus, the state’s differential
treatment of the right at stake based on the method by which that
right is exercised is purely arbitrary.198
In Richardson v. Secretary of State, the lower court found the
statutory entitlement argument persuasive, but its decision was
overturned on appeal.199 The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit declined to extend property-interest protection to the right to
vote, primarily because it lacked precedent on point for the issue.200
The circuit court did not address the merits of this question in its own
right and provided a relatively scant discussion of the procedural due
process claim.201 It further opined that the proper standard of review
for such a question is the Anderson-Burdick sliding scale, and
applying Mathews would be a form of judicial overreach.202 While it is
true that Anderson-Burdick is the constitutional equal protection test

194.
See Larose, 489 F. Supp. 3d at 737–39; Voting by Mail and Absentee Voting, supra
note 73.
192 See Drew Desilver, Mail-in Voting Became Much More Common in 2020 Primaries as
COVID-19 Spread, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-

tank/2020/10/13/mail-in-voting-became-much-more-common-in-2020-primaries-as-covid-19spread/ [https://perma.cc/4C5B-6CZW].
196.
See Voting by Mail and Absentee Voting, supra note 73 (finding that the use of
mail-in voting has increased steadily over the years, with a sharp uptick in 2020).
197.
See, e.g., Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing how the
preclusion of discretion is crucial to the finding of a property interest).
198.
See id.
199.
See Richardson v. Tex. Sec’y of State, 485 F. Supp. 3d 744, 794–95 (W.D. Tex. 2020).
200.
See Richardson v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 220, 233 (5th Cir. 2020).
201.
See id. at 233–35.
202.
See Hughs, 978 F.3d at 233, 235. The court in Hughs believes Mathews does not
account for the state’s interest in regulating voting, but this is patently untrue. See id. at 235.
The Mathews test expressly considers costs to the state in affording process in view of the
particular interest potentially deprived. See infra Section II.A. The Anderson-Burdick sliding
scale is the standard of review courts use to determine whether ballot access restrictions violate
14th Amendment Equal Protection. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788–89 (1983);
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
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for challenged regulations that restrict ballot access,203 the possible
application of one legal test to a question does not foreclose the use of
another; signature matching can and should be evaluated under both
the Anderson-Burdick sliding scale and Mathews.
Other courts have contemplated whether the right to vote is a
liberty interest, but this argument is weakened by the fluid nature of
the legal definition of “liberty.”204 Throughout history, the Supreme
Court has solidified the idea that constitutional liberty goes beyond its
most traditional conception of freedom from bodily restraint or
intrusion; liberty interests encompass other rights, like those
“essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”205 The
Court has established voting as a fundamental right but not as a
liberty interest under due process.206 On the one hand, Fourteenth
Amendment due process jurisprudence leaves room for the Court to
find that the right to vote is a liberty interest, but there is currently
much disagreement among the lower courts that have addressed this
issue.207 On the other hand, the creation of protectable entitlements in
the Goldberg line of cases is well established and relatively
straightforward.208
At least one state supreme court has contemplated the right to
vote as a protectable property interest under due process.209 In State v.
Staten, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared:
It matters not by what name it is designated—the right to vote, the elective
franchise, or the privilege of the elective franchise—the person who, under the
Constitution and laws of the State, is entitled to it, has a property in it, which the
203.
See, e.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (applying the Anderson-Burdick test to a
challenged regulation).
204.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (listing cases in which courts have
attempted to define liberty).
205.
See id. The Court recognizes the following rights, in particular, as liberty interests:
the right to contract, have a job, pursue an education, marry, have a home, raise children, and
practice religion freely. Id. The Court went on to explain a well-known principle of due process
doctrine, that the state cannot interfere with liberty interests without a legitimate reason to do
so. Id. at 399–400.
206.
See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
561–62 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367 (1886).
207.
Compare Democracy N.C. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 476 F. Supp. 3d 158, 227
(M.D.N.C. 2020) (finding a liberty interest in the right to vote), Richardson v. Tex. Sec’y of State,
485 F. Supp. 3d 734, 777 n.27 (W.D. Tex. 2020) (finding a liberty interest in the right to vote),
and Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 47–49 (D. Me. 2001) (finding a liberty interest in the right
to vote), with Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 482 F. Supp. 3d 673, 687 (M.D.
Tenn. 2020) (finding no liberty interest in the right to vote).
208.
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–63 (1970); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 601 (1972); Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577–78 (1972).
209.
See State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233, 257–58 (1869).
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law maintains and vindicates, as vigorously as it does any right of any kind which
men may have and enjoy.210

The court squarely addressed procedural due process and held
that the right to vote cannot be deprived without due process of law.211
While no US Supreme Court case dispositively holds that the
right to vote is a property or liberty interest for the purposes of
procedural due process, the Court has long established the importance
of the franchise.212 Throughout history, the Court has recognized the
right to vote as fundamental because it is “preservative of all
rights.”213 The Court’s emphasis on the importance of the right to vote
in a democratic society, taken together with its broad articulation of
property interests, forms a strong argument for the right to vote as a
property interest under due process.214 As such, the right to vote
deserves the constitutional protections set forth in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.215
B. Applying Mathews to the Right to Vote
If voting is a property interest, then existing signature
matching processes are inadequate to conform with the Constitution.
Applying Mathews, the interest at issue is extraordinarily
important.216 For example, if the interest in the receipt of utility
subsidies is high enough to warrant a guarantee of a hearing for those
denied benefits—like it was in the landmark case of Kapps v.
Wing—then the interest in the ability to ensure one’s participation in
a foundational piece of American democracy rises to, at least, the same
level.217 Beyond what the Court has cemented in its jurisprudence
about the right to vote, there is no doubt among scholars, politicians,
and laypersons alike as to the franchise’s fundamental importance to
democracy.218 Signature matching is an inaccurate fraud prevention
measure and thereby raises the risk of erroneous ballot rejection.219
210.
See id. at 243.
211.
See id.
212.
See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923).
213.
See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
214.
See id. at 370–74; e.g., supra Section II.A.
215.
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
216.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976).
217.
See Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 119–20.
218.
See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62;
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
219.
See supra Section I.D.
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The value of adding safeguards to prevent erroneous deprivation
corresponds to the value of the franchise itself—eligible voters should
not be deprived of effective participation in the political process,
regardless of their demographic group. Effective participation in the
franchise is necessary to maintain accurate representation in
government and sow seeds of confidence and legitimacy in the US
democratic system.220 While the state’s interest in preventing voter
fraud is high, the federal government is better suited to do so because
it has superior infrastructure to implement improved fraud prevention
technologies.221 An agency-focused solution will be the most effective
and cost-efficient.222
III. THE REGULATORY STATE CAN CURE ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATIONS OF
THE RIGHT TO VOTE
A. Strengthen Executive Agency Power Over State Election
Administration
State election commissions should not use signature matching
to verify absentee ballots unless the technology can be significantly
improved. The question of what kind of technology should replace
signature matching is answered by the regulatory state.223
The EAC exists to ensure that elections are conducted fairly
and securely.224 With a legislative boost from Congress, the EAC could
protect procedural due process by using evidence and data-backed
regulations that use effective methods of voter fraud prevention.225 It
could promulgate regulations that require the use of technologies
already in existence, like ASV, blockchain, or internet voting.
Alternatively, it can direct experts to research novel technologies that
can reduce erroneous deprivation.226
Congress creates agencies to fill regulatory gaps when it lacks
the expertise or capacity to legislate in a particular area.227 The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and countless enabling statutes
220.

See Fabienne Peter, Political Legitimacy, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (Apr. 24, 2017),

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/#SouPolLeg [https://perma.cc/HB5T-S643].
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
(2021).

See infra Part III.
See id.
See infra Section III.A.
See EAC OVERVIEW, supra note 70, at 2–3.
See infra Part III.
See id.
See generally JACOB A. STEIN & GLENN A. MITCHELL, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.02
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enacted by Congress give executive branch agencies mandates to act
as mini governments with both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
functions.228 Due process requirements are especially relevant to
administrative agencies when they engage in their quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory functions.229
When agencies make individual determinations that affect
protected interests (i.e., life, liberty, or property), the Constitution
demands due process.230 This quality is precisely why an
administrative agency should be tasked with developing solutions to a
due process violation, such as the erroneous deprivation of the right to
vote. The protection of procedural due process is inherent within the
regulatory state’s legal infrastructure; it acts as a filter for nonsensical
regulations not supported by data.231 The APA requires that
regulations adhere to certain thresholds of effectiveness and
reasonableness.232 The notice and comment rulemaking process—the
primary way executive agencies like the EAC regulate—requires that
an agency publish the data it relied on when it selected a particular
regulation.233 Regulations that would lead to a high risk of erroneous
deprivation will not meet those standards, and if they do, parties can
challenge them post hoc through litigation.234
The agency must also make rational connections between its
chosen policy and the legislative goals set out by Congress in its
authorizing statute.235 For a regulation to be reasonable, the agency
must make rational connections to the data offered, show that it
considered alternatives, and explain why it ultimately decided on the
chosen policy over those alternatives.236 Signature matching can only
228.
See id. § 1.02(1).
229.
See id. § 1.02(3).
230.
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
231.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43–44
(1983); United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 247 (2d Cir. 1977); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 401–02 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
232.
See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 33–34, 43–44.
233.
See N.S. Food Prods., 568 F.2d at 251 (invalidating an FDA regulation because the
agency stifled effective comment and did not provide an adequate statutorily required
“Statement of Basis and Purpose” by failing to publish the data it relied on); Portland Cement,
486 F.2d at 393 (“It is not consonant with the purpose of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate
rules on the basis of inadequate data, or on data that, critical degree, is known only to the
agency.”).
234.
See 5 U.S.C. § 704.
235.
See Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852, 854 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (ruling that a published regulation’s “Statement of Basis and Purpose” must address how
the regulation achieves the objectives of the statute that authorizes the regulation).
236.
See id.; FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 262 (2016).
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survive the notice and comment rulemaking process and subsequent
judicial review if the EAC can produce and explain data to justify the
technique’s effectiveness as a fraud prevention measure.237 Further,
the agency approach allows for new regulations as more data and
better practices emerge, instead of waiting for a lengthy legislative
process to update the law.238
Congress should statutorily authorize the EAC to promulgate
election administration regulations through the notice and comment
rulemaking process that is common to most agencies.239 A revitalized
EAC could employ experts to research and develop effective fraud
prevention regulations focused on more effective signature matching
technology or alternative methods altogether.
B. Two Frameworks for EAC Regulations
There are two pillars in the Mathews inquiry around which
solutions can be built.240 The first involves improving notice and
opportunity to cure without necessarily reducing the risk of erroneous
deprivation.241 Legally, this can cure the defect,242 but it is more
complicated overall. It involves more steps from point A (casting a
vote) to point B (counting that vote) when a ballot is rejected; the onus
is then on the voter to cure his ballot.243
Improving notification processes and opportunities to cure is an
important goal in the short term and should be part of any
comprehensive plan to reduce due process violations. Some states and
groups have already begun to explore improved notification
processes.244 For example, the Every Vote Counts Act in California
requires election officials to notify voters at least eight days before an
election is certified that their vote was rejected for failed signature
match.245 A Stanford University study suggests ways to continue
improving upon this Act and proposes methods to notify the voter of
237.
See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43–44; N.S. Food Prods., 568 F.2d at 251; Portland
Cement, 486 F.2d at 393; Dole, 809 F.2d at 852; Elec. Power Supply, 577 U.S. at 262.
238.
See
Cynthia
Scheopner,
Administrative
Procedure
Act,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Administrative-Procedures-Act
[https://perma.cc/S6D6K2B2] (last visited Oct. 26, 2021).
239.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
240.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
241.
See id.
242.
See id.
243.
See Stanford Report, supra note 90, at 14.
244.
See id.
245.
See id.
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his or her mismatched signature.246 These include (1) providing a
return envelope for the documents required to cure with postage; (2)
providing notification letters in the voter’s language; (3) developing
standard statewide signature verification guidelines; (4) collecting
several signatures from voters when they register to vote; (5)
developing a lifetime database of signatures to allow election workers
to see how signatures change over time; (6) explicitly informing
absentee voters that their signature will be compared and verified; (7)
allowing voters to view the signature the state has on file for them;
and (8) providing Department of Motor Vehicles with higher
resolution stylus pads.247 These recommendations are realistic and
practical ways to increase due process protection of absentee voting,
but none go far enough to safeguard the right to vote.248
While improving notification procedures is not harmful and
should be part of any regulatory overhaul to improve ballot-count
accuracy, there are more opportunities for ballots to be rejected if the
state solely improves or increases notification and cure processes.
Focusing on improving the technology of signature matching, or
verifying absentee votes to prevent fraud in some other capacity, can
cure the procedural due process defects via the reduction of erroneous
deprivation,249 which is why an expanded EAC is critical.
C. The EAC is an Appropriate Solution to the Problem of Signature
Matching
At present, HAVA strictly limits the EAC’s rulemaking
power.250 It is limited to producing guidance on topics outside of voter
registration.251 It also lacks enforcement power and must leave that
job to the Department of Justice or state-based enforcement
mechanisms.252 As such, the EAC’s primary powers involve doling out
federal funds to improve state election administration, as well as
collecting and sharing information about election administration to

246.
See id. at 4–5.
247.
See id.
248.
See id.
249.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
250.
There have been a few proposals to eliminate the limit placed on the EAC’s
rulemaking power put forth by Congresspeople interested in expanding the agency’s role. See
EAC OVERVIEW, supra note 70, at 4, 23.
251.
See id. at 4.
252.
See id.

2021]

THE PERFECT MATCH

151

help develop improvements.253 Hence, there is no doubt that the EAC
is the sole agency that focuses on election administration; the Federal
Election Commission, alternatively, focuses on campaign finance, not
election administration.254 Despite the fact that the EAC is weak as a
regulatory body, it is the only agency with a mandate appropriately
tailored to handle the regulation of practices like signature
matching.255
The EAC does promulgate guidance on how states should meet
their new obligations under HAVA, but like all guidance, it is
non-binding.256 States choose whether to abide by the EAC’s
recommendations, and there is no penalty if they do not.257 The EAC
has produced relatively basic guidance about signature matching in
particular.258 It primarily details clerical considerations about running
an organized operation.259 It gives helpful suggestions, like
color-coding trays for ballots at different stages in the verification
process and hand counting the total number of accepted and rejected
ballots to make sure it matches the number in the electronic
registration database.260 However, noticeably absent from the
guidelines is how a person is supposed to conduct a signature
comparison.261 The guidance generally assumes the election
commission will have ASV at its disposal, which does not align with
the reality of most local election commissions: only eight states
currently use it.262 The ASV guidance is scant and mentions nothing
about ASV’s ability to match signatures more accurately.263 Rather,
the focus of ASV’s benefit is how it can make the counting process
faster and more efficient.264
There is no information about acceptable error rates or proper
sample sizes against which to check the technology’s accuracy.265 The
section that addresses the potential lack of an ASV system only

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See id. at 5, 7.
See id. at 11.
See id. at 4–5; 52 U.S.C. § 20922.
See EAC OVERVIEW, supra note 70, at 4.
See id.
See EAC SIGNATURE GUIDANCE, supra note 88, at 1.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 3.
See Wiggers, supra note 6.
See EAC SIGNATURE GUIDANCE, supra note 88 at 2–3.
See id.
See Wiggers, supra note 6.
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addresses how to reduce delays in the checking process.266 There is no
instruction about the method a person should use to compare
signatures manually.267 The guidance wisely recommends election
officials be trained and describes a “Tiered System of Review” to
ensure ballots are not erroneously rejected.268 As the evidence shows,
however, the manual methods used are so ineffective that putting
more sets of eyes on a signature is unlikely to make the process more
accurate.269 The recommended cure process suggests notifying voters
whose ballots have been rejected, but there are no guidelines about
adequate time and opportunity for the voter to cure the ballot.270 Even
if there were more helpful guidelines, states have no obligation to
adhere to non-binding guidance, so the EAC’s ability to protect voters
from due process violations is virtually non-existent.271
Despite the EAC’s relative inability to regulate, Congress
contemplated the idea that states can be commandeered to comport
with some specific election administration requirements.272 For
example, HAVA sets mandatory standards with which states must
comply; these include (1) mandating that voting systems enable voters
to verify and correct their ballots, (2) requiring first-time voters who
register by mail to provide identification, (3) offering provisional
ballots, (4) making certain voter information available at the polls,
and (5) maintaining computerized voter registration systems.273 It
therefore would not be unprecedented for Congress to expand the
EAC’s power into new regulatory enforcement territory.274
Although the EAC needs a legislative boost, it has the
infrastructure to take on new regulatory responsibilities.275 The
agency currently has a broad mandate to conduct election
administration research and has avenues for stakeholders to share
their expertise.276 Therefore, the EAC is already equipped to begin
gathering the data it needs to develop effective regulations.277

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

See EAC SIGNATURE GUIDANCE, supra note 88 at 2–3.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 3–4.
See supra Section I.D.
See EAC SIGNATURE GUIDANCE, supra note 88 at 5–6.
See EAC OVERVIEW, supra note 70, at 4.
See id. at 1 n.4.
See id.
See id. at 23–24.
See id. at 7–8.
See id.
See id.
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The EAC’s ability to promulgate such regulations is not
hindered by the limitations of federalism or equal sovereignty either,
at least with regard to federal elections.278 It has long been established
that the federal government maintains broad power to regulate
elections in regard to their time, place, and manner (TPM) under the
Elections Clause of the Constitution.279 Although states tend to have
substantial control over the administration of their elections, they are
mostly shielded from federal intervention in determining voter
qualifications, as opposed to determining the time, place, and manner
of their elections.280 States can require that absentee voters provide
signatures in order to cast a ballot.281 However, states do not have
complete control over how that signature can be used.282 While the
Court has not spoken directly to the issue of whether the TPM
umbrella includes signature matching, it bears a closer resemblance to
those regulations within the umbrella, as opposed to those that count
as qualifications.283 For example, the Supreme Court struck down
Arizona’s requirement that voters show “proof” of citizenship to
register to vote.284 The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)
required states to use its near-uniform, federal form in which an
otherwise eligible voter merely had to attest to his or her citizenship
under penalty of perjury.285 The Court explained that federal law
preempted any further requirement by the state.286 Because of this
278.
Cf. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 534–35, 544–46 (2013) (explaining that the
preclearance mechanism of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 did not violate the limitations of
federalism or equal sovereignty because it was implemented in response to “[t]he ‘blight of racial
discrimination in voting’”).
279.
See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2013).
280.
See id. at 17.
281.
Cf. id. at 17–20 (holding that citizenship is a “qualification” that the states could
permissibly impose upon otherwise eligible voters).
282.
See Daniel P. Tokaji, Shelby County v. Holder: Don’t Forget the Elections Clause,
SCOTUS BLOG (Feb. 13, 2013, 11:43 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/shelby-countyv-holder-dont-forget-the-elections-clause/ [https://perma.cc/8XZQ-39RY]; cf. Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 19–20 (holding that the state could not require voters to show proof of citizenship
in order to vote because that goes beyond the time, place, and manner requirements Congress set
out in the National Voter Registration Act).
283.
See, e.g., Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 17–19; Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710,
749–50 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that the National Voter Registration Act preempted a Kansas
law requiring proof of citizenship to register to vote because voter registration is a time, place,
and manner regulation); League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Sullivan, 5 F.4th 714, 724 (7th
Cir. 2021) (holding that the National Voter Registration Act preempted an Indiana law
prescribing voter registration cancellation procedures that conflicted with those in the Act).
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preemption, Arizona’s additional requirement that one must show
proof was unconstitutional.287
In the case of signature matching, a hypothetical federal
requirement that an absentee ballot has a signature is analogous to
the requirement that a voter attests to his or her citizenship and
therefore falls under the TPM umbrella.288 A voter qualification, on
the other hand, could be that the identity of the voter is valid; in other
words, the person who fills out the ballot must be the person for whom
the ballot is meant. However, supplying a signature on a ballot is not
a qualification in and of itself, the same way attesting to one’s
citizenship on the federal form was not a qualification; it is simply a
method of verifying the genuineness of the ballot.289 Therefore, the
agency should be free to ensure states are using signatures on
absentee ballots appropriately.290
Furthermore, HAVA itself mandates that in-person voting
systems give voters the ability to verify and correct their ballots.291
This verification mandate is analogous to the notification and curing
procedures that would help remedy the procedural due process
problems endemic in the low-quality signature matching procedures
currently used by states.292 It is already evident that, at the very least,
it is within Congress’s purview to mandate analogous notification and
cure procedures that give voters enough time to correct their rejected
ballots with ease.293 Accordingly, the EAC has the agency
infrastructure and the constitutional authority to best regulate and
improve the practice of signature matching.294
IV. CONCLUSION
The historical fight for voting rights and the doctrine that has
developed in election and constitutional law, respectively, make it
clear that the practice of signature matching improperly thwarts the
franchise.295 Examined against the background of the struggle for
minorities and Black people to obtain a right owed to them under the
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
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See id.; Clerkin et al., supra note 3, at 42–43.
See EAC OVERVIEW, supra note 70, at 1 n.4.
See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section I.D.

2021]

THE PERFECT MATCH

155

US Constitution, it is clear that such an ineffective practice has no
place in a democracy that seeks to accurately capture its people’s
choice for who will best represent them.296 At best, signature matching
appeases those concerned about election fraud.297 At worst, it unjustly
disenfranchises voters and reduces the public’s faith in the legitimacy
of democratic elections—the evidence of the latter is overwhelming
and increasing.298
The right to vote is a cognizable property interest under
procedural due process.299 Property interests warrant the procedural
due process protections enumerated in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and any erroneous deprivation of a person’s property
interest is a violation of his or her constitutional rights.300
Furthermore, there are particular groups—namely, the old, young, ill,
non-native English speakers, Democratic party voters, and
minorities—to whom the practice poses a greater threat.301 The
burden these groups face is troublesome, and it only appears to be
growing as the prevalence of mail-in voting increases.302 The
expansion of mail-in voting should be a welcome development in
election administration, as it gives more people flexibility as to where
and when they cast their ballots.303 Stifling the progress of voting
expansion with a pretextual “fraud prevention” measure only serves to
weaken democracy.304
There are ways to streamline and improve the process of
signature matching itself.305 However, a better solution would reach
more aspects of election administration in order to ensure that
procedural due process and other constitutional rights violations do
not continue to go unaccounted for.306 An expanded EAC can achieve
this end through effective and efficient means.307 The regulatory
state’s demand for data, and a rational connection between that data
and the proposed regulation, ensure that only those regulations that
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further Congress’s goals are enacted.308 The EAC can use its agency
infrastructure to gather research and expertise about fraud detection
methods that do not infringe on individuals’ constitutional rights.309
These methods include improved signature matching and notification
practices, as well as pioneering methods that have yet to be developed.
The implications of allowing this practice to go unchecked are
significant, both constitutionally and existentially.310 Such a blatant
due process violation is unsustainable under US precedents and under
the broader value of democratic representation that the US system of
government embodies. The public’s faith in that system is
fundamental to the maintenance of American democracy.311 Without
legitimacy, the right to vote means nothing.
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